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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL PERSONAL INCOME
TAX WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ST. LOUIS
The planlessness of American municipal growth and the pro-
gressive decay of the older sections of our cities have driven
many for whom the cities still serve as centers of employment
and of marketing to suburban residential areas. In consequence
has come an aggravation of the difficulties of metropolitan man-
agement and, not least, in financing the increased services de-
manded from revenues constantly decreased by the steady migra-
tion of taxpayers beyond their borders.1
In this disturbing development, St. Louis has had its full share
and is seeking in common with other similarly situated munici-
palities a solution to the vexing problems presented thereby. Con-
solidation with or annexation of the surrounding areas, expedi-
ents fashionable at one period in American municipal develop-
ment, have latterly fallen into substantial disuse,2 perhaps be-
cause of resistance on the part of dwellers in the affected areas.
Such measures are only feebly and occasionally advanced as
methods for relieving the pressures arising from fugitive re-
sources.
As a more feasible plan for overcoming this financial loss to
St. Louis, it has been suggested that the city adopt a municipal
income tax, to be levied on the gross income received by all per-
sons employed in the city of St. Louis-non-residents as well as
residents. While no such ordinance has yet been submitted to
the Board of Aldermen, there has already been much discussion
of the legal validity of an ordinance of this nature and of its
desirability from an economic and a sociological standpoint. This
note-will concern itself only with the question of the-legal validity
of such a municipal income ordinance.
It may be stated generally that a municipal corporation is a
government of enumerated powers. More specifically, a munici-
pal corporation possesses and can exercise the following classes
1. Mumford, The Future of the American City, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Dec. 11, 1938, Sixtieth Anniversary Section, pp. 7-8.
2. In recent years only Detroit and Los Angeles have made any large
additions in this manner. New York has annexed no territory for over
35 years, Philadelphia is only .1 of a square mile larger than in 1854,
San Francisco is the same size as in 1856, and St. Louis preserves the
straitened confines of 1876. Lepowsky, Changing Bases of American Munici-
pal Government (1938) 199 Annals 212.
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of powers and no others: (1) those granted in express words;(2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; and (3) those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient,
but indispensable.3
St. Louis is a home rule city, authorized as such by the Consti-
tution of Missouri to adopt its own charter.4 The charter itself
provides that "It [the city of St. Louis] shall have power to
assess, levy, and collect taxes for all general special5 purposes
on all subjects or objects of taxation." The power to levy and
enforce an income tax is not conferred eo nomine in the charter
or in any of the constitutional or statutory provisions relating
to St. Louis. Therefore, in order for a tax of this nature to be
sustainable, it must appear (1) that the power to levy such a
tax may be implied from the general grant of taxing power in
the charter; (2) that such implication does not conflict with any
state laws; and (3) that the tax proposed would not violate any
state or federal constitutional provisions.
I. IMPLIED POWER TO TAX
The charter itself prescribes the rules for construction of the
enumerated powers, providing inter alia that "the enumeration
of particular powers in this charter is not exclusive of others,
nor restrictive of general words or phrases granting powers
** *..,7 This proposition may be stated affirmatively thus: the
city may exercise all the powers within the fair intent and pur-
3. 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) 448, sec. 237, quoted
and followed in: St. Louis v. Kaime (1903) 180 Mo. 309, 79 S. W. 1407
Electric Light and Power Co. v. St. Louis (1913) 253 Mo. 592, 161 S. W.
1166. To the same effect: St. Louis v. Telephone Co. (1888) 96 Mo. 623,
10 S. W. 197, 2 L. R. A. 278, 9 Am. St. Rep. 370; Independence v. Cleve-
land (1902) 167 Mo. 384, 67 S. W. 216; Joplin v. Jacobs (1906) 119 Mo.
App. 134, 96 S. W. 219. "They can exercise no powers but those which are
conferred upon them by the act by which they are constituted, or such
as are necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers, the performance
of their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of the purposes of their
association. This principle is derived from the nature of the corporation,
the mode in which they are organized and which in which their affairs must
be conducted." Spaulding v. Lowell (1839) 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 71, 74, per
Shaw, C. J.
4. See discussion supported by note 29, infra.
5. The charter provision actually reads "general special purposes." It
would seem that "and" or "or" should be inserted between the words "gen-
eral" and "special." The italics are supplied. In Automobile Gasoline Co.
v. St. Louis (1930) 326 Mo. 435, 446, 32 S. W. (2d) 281, 285, the word
"and" is inserted without comment, so that the charter provision is there
quoted "general and special purposes."
6. Art. I, sec. 1, subsec. 1.
7. Art. I, sec. 2.
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pose of the creators of the municipal corporation which are rea-
sonably proper to give effect to or supplement powers expressly.
granted. 8 As noted earlier, the charter gives the city of St. Louis
the power to levy and collect taxes "for all general special pur-
poses on all subjects or objects of taxation."'1 While courts in
general adopt a strict rather than a liberal construction of charter
powers of municipalities,"' the power granted in the charter is
so broad and all-inclusive that it is difficult to conceive of any
tax which does not fall within its language.
That municipal corporations in Missouri have implied powers
has been affirmed by judicial decision.- This doctrine of implied
powers has been freely used in the states to mitigate the harsh-
ness of the rule that a city may exercise only expressly delegated
powers., However, in seeking what powers will be implied, one
must bear in mind the rule that a municipal corporation can do
no act which may not be reasonably inferred or implied from
some authority expressly granted.-
The field of implied powers has been so broadened that, in the
absence of express limits, cities possessing only the ordinary
general powers usually granted to municipal corporations fifty
years ago, are measurably able to cope with present day prob-
lems. In the main, the courts seem to be guided here more by
reason than by precedent. In New York, for example, an ordi-
nance prohibiting the emission of dense smoke was sustained
under the general "power to enact sanitary ordinances having
the force of law."'15 Similarly in the notable case of St. Louis
Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis" an ordinance limiting the
size of billboards was sustained under the general power to regu-
late the morals, health, and public safety. In a case decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1844,17 the power of Phila-
delphia to take and administer property bequeathed in trust to
the city for specified charitable, educational, and other purposes
8. See Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. R. (1843) 15 Conn. 475, 501.
9. Supra, note 5. The italics are supplied.
10. Art. I, see. 1, subsec. 1.
11. Thomson v. Lee Co. (1865) 3 Wall. 327; Thomas v. Richmond (1871)
12 Wall. 849; Lafayette v. Cox (1854) 5 Ind. 38.
12. Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora (1895) 129 Mo. 540, 576, 31 S. W. 946.
13. 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) 275, sec. 2523.
14. Ex parte Marmaduke (1886) 91 Mo. 228, 4 S. W. 91; Hill v. St.
Louis (1900) 159 Mo. 159, 60 S. W. 116; State ex rel. Reid v. Walbridge
(1894) 119 Mo. 383, 394, 24 S. W. 457.
15. People v. Horton (Sp. Sess. 1903) 41 Misc. 309, 84 N. Y. S. 942;
Dep't of Health v. Ebling Brewing Co. (Mun. Ct. 1902) 78 N. Y. S. 11.
16. (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929.
17. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127.
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was in question. Although it was not contended that the charter
of the city conferred this power eo nomine or even by specific
implication, the court held that the city did have such power
under a charter provision empowering the city "to have, pur-
chase, take, receive, possess, and enjoy lands," and a preamble
referring broadly to the "promotion of trade, industry, and hap-
piness."
To return to taxation, it is pertinent to note that in the fairly
recent case of Automobile Gasoline Co. v. St. Louis'18 it was held
that charter provisions delegating the power to tax "all subjects
or objects of taxation" include power to tax persons and occupa-
tions, even occupations already subject to a license tax. It was
argued that "subjects or objects of taxation" was intended to
include only real and personal property, but the court rejected
the contention, saying:
The language used in clause 1 is not restricted to real and
personal property. It says "all subjects or objects of tax-
ation," which, as above stated, includes persons * * *. We
think it apparent from other provisions of the charter as
well as from the wording of clauses 1 and 2 that said clauses
were intended to mean just what they said. * * * It is prob-
ably true that the framers of the charter thought, from some
decisions prior to the adoption of the present charter, that
they could give and were giving to the city power to tax any
business [or person] by the use of general language such as
was used in clause 1 * * It was evidently their purpose
so to'do.* * *
It is said in St. Louis v. Herthel, 88 Mo. 128, that in con-
struing a charter, "we are to construe it according to the
intent of the framers, and that intent must be gathered from
the language and object of the charter provisions, and giving
that language an interpretation neither strict nor strained."1
Congress, in establishing the Organic Act for the Territory of
Hawaii, provided that "the legislative power of the Territory
shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States locally ap-
plicable."20 Three years after the Act was passed, it was held
that the legislative power of the territory includes full and com-
prehensive power to legislate in the matter of taxation.2 2 In
18. (1930) 326 Mo. 435, 32 S. W. (2d) 281.
19. 32 S. W. (2d) at 285. See also Ruschenberg v. Southern Electric R.
Co. (1901) 161 Mo. 70, 84, 61 S. W. 626; Westerman v. K. of P. (1906)
196 Mo. 670, 708, 94 S. W. 470, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1114; St. Louis v.
Baskowitz (1918) 273 Mo. 543, 556, 201 S. W. 870.
20. (1900) 31 Stat. 150, (1928) 48 U. S. C. A. sec. 562.
21. W. C. Peacock & Co. v. Pratt (Hawaii 1903) 121 Fed. 772.
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Robertson v. Pratt2 the income tax law of Hawaii was construed
in relation to the provisions of the quoted section. The power
to levy an income tax was recognized as having been granted to
the territory under this grant of the "legislative power"--a grant
even less specific in its reference than the general grant of taxing
power in the St. Louis charter upon which the power to pass an
income tax reposes.
In Virginia it has been similarly held, in a long line of deci-
sions, that a legislative grant to a municipal corporation of the
general power of taxation includes the whole power of the state
-over subjects of taxation.28 The power to tax businesses and
occupations has consequently been held to result from a general
grant of the taxing power.2'
While proponents of a strict rather than a liberal construction
of implied powers under city charters are not lacking, this posi-
tion appears upon examination to be asserted in those instances
where a municipality is undertaking to exercise powers of a
business or proprietary nature, as distinguished from purely
governmental functions.25
The following propositions would seem to summarize the mat-
ter of implied power: (1) municipal corporations may and fre-
quently do exercise implied powers ;28 (2) the power granted the
city of St. Louis by the charter to collect taxes "on all subjects
or objects of taxation" is indeed a broad and comprehensive one;
(3) income is a fit "subject or object of taxation" in Missouri ;27
(4) other jurisdictions have construed the implied power to levy
an income tax to be conferred by grants of poweir at least as
general as that contained in the St. Louis charter.2 8
II. CONFLICT WITH STATE LAWS
Power to levy an income tax, though reasonably to be implied
from the charter provision, must further hurdle the problem of
22. (1901) 13 Hawaii 590. See also Keola v. Parker (1913) 21 Hawaii
597.
23. Ould v. Richmond (1873) 64 Va. 464, 14 Am. Rep. 139; Norfolk v.
Norfolk Landmark Pub. Co. (1898) 95 Va. 564, 128 S. E. 959; Woodall v.
Lynchburg (1902) 100 Va. 318, 40 S. E. 915; Norfolk v. Griffith-Powell
Co. (1903) 102 Va. 115, 45 S. E. 889; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Suffolk(1905) 103 Va. 498, 49 S. E. 658; Standard Oil Co. v. Fredericksburg(1906) 105 Va. 82, 52 S. E. 817. But see Schoolfield v. Lynchburg (1884)
"T8 Va. 366; and Wytheville v. Johnson's Ex'r (1908) 108 Va. 589, 62 S. E.
228.
24. Ibid.
25. 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) 930-956, sees.
273-385.
26. 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d. ed. 1928) 275, sec. 2523.
27. Infra, notes 50 and 51.
28. For a good general discussion of the construction of municipal powers,
see McBain, American City Progress and the Law (1918) 30, c. II.
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possible conflict between the charter provision and state laws.
The Constitution of 1875 provides that "the city of St. Louis
may * * * frame a charter for the government of the city * * *
in harmony with and subject to the Constitution and laws of
Missouri *** "1;29 also that "notwithstanding the provisions of
this article, the General Assembly shall have the same power
over the city and county of St. Louis that it has over other cities
and counties of the State."30 Acting under the power thus con-
ferred, the city by a duly chosen board of freeholders drafted and
submitted a charter which was ratified at the polls on August
22, 1876.31 The charter thus locally begotten-the first of its
kind in the United States82-- survived with a few amendments
until superseded by another similarly adopted June 30, 1914.
Examination of the provisions of the Missouri constitution re-
veals that the drafters went to great pains to keep the city, thus
liberated as to its own government, in subordination to the state.
It is provided with abundant repetition that the charter so
framed and adopted shall "always be in harmony with and sub-
ject to the Constitution and laws of the state."33
It was inevitable that in the course of time question should be
raised as to the existence and effect of supposed conflicts between
state laws and charter provisions. In St. Louis v. Meyer,3 ' the
question concerned the authority of the city to enact a revenue
ordinance imposing a license tax upon "peddlers or hawkers" and
defining a hawker in such manner as to include farmers who
sold products of the soil by outcry or by going from place to place.
There existed at the time of the passage of this ordinance a
state statute excepting from those thereby "declared to be
peddlers" itinerant persons who sold "agricultural and horticul-
tural products." The ordinance of the city was held to be invalid.
It was urged upon the court that the definition prescribed by the
general law was only for purposes of state taxation and nowhere
evinced an intention to define who are or are not peddlers for
29. See. 20.
30. See. 25.
31. State ex rel. Beach v. Sutton (1877) 3 Mo. App. 388; State ex reT.
Beach v. Finn (1877) 4 Mo. App. 347.
32. 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) 386, see. 341.
33. See e. g., art. IX, sec. 23.
34. (1904) 185 Mo. 583, 84 S. W. 914. For earlier cases on this point
see State ex rel. Halpin v. Powers (1878) 68 Mo. 320; State ex rel. Hunt v.
Bell (1893) 119 Mo. 70, 24 S. W. 765, where the court said: "We think it
was the purpose of the act of 1893 to provide for a commissioner who should
have the sole power to issue city dramshop licenses as well as licenses on
behalf of the state; and, this intention appearing, the ordinances of St.
Louis must give way to the act as far as they are in conflict with it."
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the purpose of prohibiting municipalities from exacting a license
from such persons; but this contention was summarily rejected.85
The court commented:
The General Assembly has *** undoubted power to legis-
late for St. Louis, as for all other cities * * * to enforce
direct mandates of the fundamental law by appropriate
statutes, and to pass all proper laws that are general
throughout the State.36
Here was formulation of a doctrine to be applied in determining
what laws a home rule charter must be "consistent with" and-
"subject to"-a doctrine which was founded upon the distinction
between matters of statewide and those of merely local concern.
The prevalence of a state law over a charter provision was to.
be determined by applying the test of whether the statute dealt
with a matter of state, as contrasted with local, concern. Thus
the court in part clarified the ambiguity of the constitution by-
declaring that home rule charters must be "in harmony with"
and "subject to" those "laws of the state" which are of general
as distinguished from local concern. The latest reference to this-
question is found in Tremayne v. St. Louis, 7 involving a con-
denonation proceeding under the city charter, where the court
said:
We shall take the applicable statutes first, because, in a
broad sense, the charter of the city of St. Louis cannot con-
travene a state statute. 8
Apparently the Missouri courts recognize a domain of municipal
affairs, however vaguely defined, in which the municipality is
free to operate. Beyond this sphere the legislative power of the
state, within the limitations set for it by the constitution, is
operative and transcends all inconsistent municipal action.
But manifestly the power to frame a charter would be illusory
if the city could not, within the framework of state laws, exercise
sufficient taxing power to enable it to carry on its functions.
This was recognized in the early case of St. Louis v. Sternberg,3
where, in answer to the contention that the city could not levy
a license tax upon lawyers because this taxing power had not
been specifically conferred, the court declared:
85. Reliance for this contention was placed on the decision in Moberly
v. Hoover (1902) 93 Mo. App. 663, 67 S. W. 721.
86. State ex rel. Ziegenhein v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. (1893) 117 Mo. 1,
22 S. W. 910, affords an illustration of legislation of the latter sort.
37. (1928) 820 Mo. 120, 6 S. W. (2d) 985.
38. 6 S. W. (2d) at 94L
39. (1879) 69 Mo. 289.
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Neither state, county, nor municipal government can be
maintained without revenue, and revenue cannot be raised
without the exercise of the taxing power in some form. * * *
If the General Assembly should pass a law declaring that no
license should be required of lawyers by any municipal cor-
poration in the state, then such conflict would exist between
the charter provision and the law. 0
'The Missouri courts have on the whole been liberal in sanction-
ing the exercise of financial powers by home rule cities where
no question of conflict with a state law is raised.41 But there is
no instance of record in which a charter provision on the subject
,of local revenue has been held paramount to a state law with
which it was deemed to be out of harmony. Nor do the decisions
reveal any consistent course of reasoning or lay down any definite
rules by which to determine when issues of supremacy are in-
volved in this connection.
Keane v. Strodtman'2 affords an illustration of a municipal
tax held invalid because it conflicted with a "state law." St.
Louis sought to tax persons erecting, maintaining, and repairing
awnings. The applicable section of the charter" enumerates a
number of callings but does not mention this particular calling.
A statute" provides:
No municipal corporation in this state shall have the
power to impose a license tax upon any business, avocation,
pursuit, or calling, unless such business, avocation, or call-
ing is specially named as taxable in the charter of such
municipal corporation, or unless such power be conferred by
statute.
The tax ordinance was, therefore, declared void because in con-
flict with the statute and the charter.4 5 Probably, however, it
would be comparatively simple for a home rule city that was
really bent on taxing some particular trade or calling despite
the statute to alter its charter. Other cities in the state would
of course have to await legislative action. The case just dis-
40. The doctrine of the Sternberg case was reaffined in St. Louis v..
ircher (1882) 76 Mo. 431, no additional point of importance being recorded.
41. Siemens v. Shreeve (1927) 317 Mo. 736, 296 S. W. 415; State ex rel.
Carpenter v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 870, 2 S. W. (2d) 713; State ex rel.
Zoological Board of Control v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 910, 1 S. W. (2d)
1021. The contrary view is suggested by dictum in Commerce Trust Co. v.
Syndicate Lot Co. (1921) 208 Mo. App. 261, 235 S. W. 150; Halbruegger v.
St. Louis (1924) 302 Mo. 572, 262 S. W. 379. The question has never been
clearly determined in Missouri.
42. (1929) 323 Mo. 161, 18 S. W. (2d) 896.
43. Sec. 20.
44. RI. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7287.
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cussed makes it abundantly clear that the tax involved would
be permitted if authorized in the city charter, provided there
was no conflict with any other state laws.
The proposed income tax provision may be readily distin-
guished from the license tax condemned in St. Louis v. Meyer.48
That tax was held invalid because there was a statute already
in force specifically dealing with the subject with which the ordi-
nance imposing the license tax conflicted. There are neither con-
stitutional nor statutory provisions, however, which purport to
deal with the power of St. Louis to impose an income tax; hence,
it is reasonable to conclude that there is no "state law" with
which the ordinance could conflict. The proposed tax can like-
wise be distinguished from the tax held invalid in Keane V.
Strodtman t because there a statute expressly prohibited the tax.
In St. Louis v. Stenberg 8 the court acceded to the reasoning
that while the constitution or the statutes could conceivably con-
tain provisions which'would be controlling, the absence of such.
provisions excludes the issue of conflict.
The question of conflict between the city's power to establish
an income tax and the "laws of the state" may be thus sum-
marized: (1) although St. Louis has full home rule powers, it
may not exercise any power in conflict with any "state laws";
(2) there are no constitutional or statutory provisions which.
expressly prohibit the imposition of the tax in question and,
therefore, no "state law" with which it could conflict; (3) while
the power to impose this particular tax is not expressly dele-
gated by constitutional, statutory, or charter provisions, it may
reasonably be implied.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAX
It cannot be seriously contended today that income is not a
fit subject of taxation in Missouri. As early as 1865 the Missouri
Legislature passed a statute imposing a tax on income.49 In_
Glasgow v. Rowse ° this statute was claimed to violate the con-
stitutional mandate that taxes must be levied uniformly in pro-
portion to the value of the property taxed, and that no tax may
be levied except on property; but the court rejected this conten-
tion and upheld the statute, declaring that incomes are proper
subjects of taxation in Missouri. The court added that, while it
45. To the same effect see Kansas City v. Lorber (1896) 64 Mo. App. 604-
46. (1904) 185 Mo. 588, 84 S. W. 914, cited supra, note 34.
47. (1929) 828 Mo. 161, 18 S. W. (2d) 896, cited supra, note 42.
48. (1879) 69 Mo. 289, cited supra, note 89.
49. Mo. Laws of 1865, p. 112.
50. (1869) 48 Mo. 479.
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is true that the constitution lays down a uniformity rule as to
the imposition of taxes on property, this does not abridge the
legislative power to provide for revenue from other sources.,,
The proposals and discussions with regard to a St. Louis in-
come tax have premised the following features as items in.the
,ordinance as, if, and when it is adopted:
(1) A tax on the gross earned income of every person residing,
or employed or engaged in business, or in the practice or pursuit
of any profession, trade, vocation, or occupation of any kind,
mature, or character whatsoever within the territorial limits of
the city of St. Louis.
(2) Exemptions for incomes paid by the United States, in-
comes derived exclusively from capital investments, and pensions
and payments made pursuant to workmen's compensation acts
-or as damages for injuries to person or property, thus leaving
wages, salaries, fees, commissions, gains, profits, royalties,
'bonuses, donations, honorariums, and all other amounts received
.as comlsensation for personal services actually rendered, to con-
.stitute the incomes subject to tax.
(3) Authorized deduction from the tax of a sum equal to all
-other taxes levied by, and paid directly to, the city of St. Louis
by the taxpayer in the previous year, upon certification of such
payment by the license collector.
(4) Employer collection of the tax at its source by withholding
the amount of the tax from payments of earned income to em-
ployees, less any deduction for other taxes paid, as certified by
-the license collector, other persons subject to the tax, from whose
earned income the tax has not been deducted by an employer,
to be required to keep accurate records of gross earned income
:and make periodic reports to the license collector.
Item three, the "deductions" clause, in the above summary
,outline is of particular interest inasmuch as application of this
clause might conceivably result in discriminations violative of
the equal protection clauses of the Federal and Missouri consti-
tutions. Concretely the particular incidence of the discrimination
would be upon residents of St. Louis County and of the neigh-
boring section of the state of Illinois. It is a matter of common
knowledge that a large though unascertained number of such
suburban residents earn their livelihoods within the city, pur-
suing their several occupations side by side with residents of
51. To the same effect see Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wolibrinck (191P)
275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196; see also Note (1939) 24 WASHINGTON U. LAW
.QuARTERLY, 242, 247.
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the city of St. Louis. Whether this commuting element in the
city's economic life must pay a tax on income from which asso-
ciates and competitors resident in the city are relieved is a
matter of practical and legal moment.
The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence
of government. The restriction that it shall not be so exercised
as to deny to any the equal protection of the laws has been held
not to compel the adoption of an iron-clad rule of equal taxation
nor to prevent all differences in tax laws. 52 The fact that a
statute discriminates in favor of a certain class does not make
it arbritrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable
distinction,5 or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
to sustain it."
The limitations of the Federal Constitution apply with the
same force to local as to state taxes,5 on the theory that acts of
a local government constitute acts of the state. These applicable
limitations include, in addition to the equal protection clause,"
the commerce clause 7 and due process with its various ramifica-
tions as to retroactivity, 8 arbitrary or unfair procedure, ' and
the requirement that the tax be for a public purpose.60 In addi-
tion there is the problem of exemption of all federal instrumen-
talities under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.1
52. State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson (1930) 283 U. S. 527; Bell's
Gap . I. v. Pennsylvania (1890) 134 U. S. 232; Southwestern Oil Co. v.
Texas (1910) 217 U. S. 114; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky (1910) 217
U. S. 563.
68. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana (1900) In U. S. 89.
54. Rant v. Van Deman (1916) 240 U. S. 324; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall(1912) 228 U. S. 69.
55. Home Tel. & Tel Co. v. Los Angeles (1913) 227 U. S. 278; Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. N. C. Corp. Comm. (1907) 206 U. S. 1; Carter v. Texas(1900) 177 U. S. 442; Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 573.
56. U. S. Conat. Amend. XIV, Sec. 1. See Puget Sound v. Seattle (1934)
291 U. S. 619; State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson (1931) 288 U. S.
527.
57. See Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority through the
Taxing Power of the States (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 907; Powell, Com-
merce Clause Controversies over State Taxation (1928) 76 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 778; U. S. Const. Art. I, See. 8, cl. 3.
58. Untermeyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440.
59. Dukich v. Blair (E. D. Wash. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 303, appeal dismissed(1925) 270 U. S. 670.
60. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace (1935) 288 U. S. 249. See also
'tate ex rel. Kansas City v. Orear (1919) 277 Mo. 303, 210 S. W. 392,
where the taxpayer obtained no special benefit.
61. For recent discussions of this problem see Freedman, Government-
-wned Corporations and Intergovernmental Tax Immunity (1938) 24
WASmNGTON U. LAW QuAR LY 46; Miller, The Intergovernmental Prob-
lem in Taxation of Officers and Securities (1936) 2 Legal Notes on Local
Gov't 8. See also Powell, Indirect Encroachment on the Federal Authority
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Philadelphia is, so far as the writer has been able to ascertain,
the only city in the United States which has a municipal income
tax, and its ordinance was only recently adopted.6 2 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has in its current term upheld the im-
post.63 The-tax purports to be levied on all persons employed in
Philadelphia, regardless of where they reside. The ordinance
provides, however, that every resident of Philadelphia may de-
duct from the amount of his income before computing the tax,
the amount of the real estate tax paid on his dwelling, regardless
of whether he is the owner. This deduction was held to be not
discriminatory and not violative of the equal protection clause.0'
No other instances have been found passing on the validity
of exemptions or deductions from city income taxes under the
equal protection clause. The paucity of authority is no doubt
attributable to the novelty and infrequency of the tax. Caution
must therefore be exercised in drawing conclusions as to the
constitutionality of the proposed tax, with respect to its deduc-
tions or exemptions. In decisions on other kinds of taxes, such
as license taxes, the issue of discrimination often seems to turn
on relatively narrow distinctions in the character of the tax with
reference to which the deduction is authorized. Thus in a fairly
recent Alabama case65 an ordinance imposing a license tax on
sellers of motor fuels and other oils, exempting those who pur-
chased from local dealers or distributors, but taxing those who
purchased from non-resident dealers under contracts to buy de-
by the Taxing Powers of the States (1919) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 321; Cohen
and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of
Federal Activities (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 807.
In addition, with reference to court procedure and legal remedies, there
is a limitation imposed by a federal statute upon a local tax which does
not prevail in the case of a state tax. Thus a taxpayer cannot sue to.
obtain an injunction from the federal statutory court to enjoin the collection
of an unconstitutional city tax. Sec. 266 of the Judicial Code (1910) 3.
Stat. 557, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 380. He must make application to a
district court judge since it has been uniformly held that the question of
constitutionality of legislation enacted by a subdivision of a state cannot
be heard by a three-judge court and that local officers cannot be enjoined.
Ex parte Williams (1928) 277 U. S. 267; see also an illuminating article
by Pepper, Enjoining the Collection of State and Local Taxes in the Federal
Court (1936) 70 U. S. L. Rev. 371. Practically, this means that the tax-
payer will lose time and that he can appeal only to the Circuit Court of
Appeals and not directly to the Supreme Court, with consequent lest chance
that certiorari will be granted.
62. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 30, 1938, p. 6-A: 1.
63. N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1938, p. 15: 4.
64. Ibid. However, the court invalidated provisions exempting all in-
comes up to $1,000 and all incomes of farmers and domestic workers, hold-
ing that they violated state constitutional requirements of uniformity.
65. Woco Pep Co. v. Montgomery (1925) 213 Ala. 452, 105 So. 214.
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livered in the city was held violative of the Alabama constitu-
tion " and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, as not equal and uniform in its incidence. With this may
be compared the dictum in St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co.,' 7
clearly intimating that a St. Louis ordinance exacting a license
tax on all boats entering the harbor, but authorizing a reduction
of forty per cent in favor of vessels owned by residents of the
city and returned and assessed for city taxation during the year
specified in the ordinance, did not violate constitutional require-
ments of uniformity.68 Of some relevance here also is the declara-
tion in the later case of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co.69 that the
requirement of uniformity of taxation is intended only to pre-
vent discrimination between objects belonging to the same class
and does not apply to licenses or taxes on privileges or occupa-
tions.70 Similarly in Arnold v. Hanna7 ' it was held that the ex-
ception of live stock dealers and grain dealers from operation of
the Commission Merchants Act 2 is not arbitrary or unreasonable
and does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The taxation of income earned within the state by nonresi-
dents presents some further questions. No special difficulty is
encountered in taxing income from property within the state or
the earnings of an employee whose duties lie entirely within the
state. The privileges and immunities clause does not entitle citi-
zens of other states to entire immunity from taxation nor to
preferential treatment as compared with resident citizens, but
only protects against discriminatory taxation. 8
The possible objection of non-residents on the ground of double
taxation in that they may have to pay a tax on the same income
66. Ala. Const. sees. 1, 35.
67. (1892) 113 Mo. 83, 20 S. W. 699.
68. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 3. See also Packet Co. v. St. Louis (1879)
100 U. S. 423.
69. (1915) 263 Mo. 387, 174 S. W. 78, writ of error dismissed (1915)
241 U. S. 647. See Note (1989) 24 WASHNGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 242,
249, 253.
70. It has repeatedly been held in Missouri that its constitutional provi-
sions do not preclude a municipal corporation from imposing and collecting
a license tax. St. Louis v. Sternberg (1879) 69 Mo. 289; St. Louis v. Spiegel(1886) 90 Mo. 257, 2 S. W. 839; St. Louis v. Bowler (1887) 94 Mo. 630, 7
S. W. 434; St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co. (1892) 113 Mo. 83, 20 S. W.
699.
71. Arnold v. Hanna (1926) 315 Mo. 823, 290 S. W. 416, affrd (1928)
276 U. S. 591; see also Watters v. People (1918) 248 U. S. 65; Payne v.
State (1918) 248 U. S. 112.
72. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 12648.
73. Shaffer v. Carter (1920) 252 U. S. 37.
1939] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
where they reside has been disposed of by the recent holding74
of the United States Supreme Court that the imposition of an
income tax by different states on the same subject of taxation
is not subject to the objection of double taxation. It should be
noted that the United States has recognized the existence of
international double taxation and, in taxing citizens and domestic
corporations on income earned from all sources, allows certain
credits for taxes paid to foreign governments or possessions of
the United States.75 In like manner, New York alleviates the
burden of double taxation, although not required to do so by the
Federal Constitution, by permitting deductions from taxes pay-
able to the state by non-residents on income earned within the
state, amounting to such proportion of the tax paid to the domi-
ciliary state as the income earned in New York bears to the total
income .7 6 It is submitted that a similar plan for avoiding double
taxation would be equitable if a St. Louis income tax is adopted.
An additional possible ground for attacking the tax might be
that by making the employer collect the tax an undue burden is
placed on him. This duty of collecting the tax at its source at
some possible cost to the employer has been held not to be re-
pugnant to due process of law as a taking of property without
compensation.
A final question for consideration is whether the tax or the
deductions are so unreasonable as to violate constitutional re-
quirements of uniformity. In St. Louis v. United Rys. Co. of St.
Louis1 it was held that only the clearest case of unreasonableness
and unfairness will justify a court in holding invalid on those
grounds an ordinance enacted in pursuance of the city's charter
and not otherwise violative of the constitution. If such an ordi-
nance is oppressive, the remedy lies primarily with the state or
municipal legislative bodies, not with the courts. The same idea
was expressed as early as 1869 in an opinion by Judge Wagner,
wherein he said :7
That the tax in question was exceedingly onerous is un-
doubted; but it may be said that there is nothing very poeti-
cal or romantic about tax laws, at best. They are exacting
74. People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves (1937) 300 U. S. 308; see also Note
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 727.
75. (1928) 45 Stat. 829, (1928) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 131.
76. Such credits are allowed, however, only in cases where the other
state grants substantially similar credits to New York residents. N. Y. Tax
Law (1921) sec. 363.
77. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. (1915) 240 U. S. 1.
78. (1915) 263 Mo. 387, 174 S. W. 78.
79. Glasgow v. Rowse (1869) 43 Mo. 479, 489.
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and remorseless, and do not discriminate with any particular
nicety as to individual convenience. But mere oppressiveness
is no ground for setting them aside or arresting their oper-
ation.
Indeed municipal corporations are prima fade the sole judges
of the necessity or desirability of their ordinances, and the courts
will not ordinarily review their reasonableness when passed in
compliance with authority.80
It might be contended that to allow a deduction for other taxes
paid, as does the proposed municipal income tax under considera-
tion, tends to deviate from the requirements of uniformity and
equality. Pragmatically, however, the contrary is true. Equality
and not preference is the end sought to be achieved by the de-
ductions and in most instances would be the actual consequence.
A somewhat similar situation arose in the "use tax" case recently
decided by the United States Supreme Court.81 The state of
Washington had imposed a tax on the use of personality pur-
chased at retail either within or without the state, with provi-
sion for an offset if the article had been subjected to an equiva-
lent use or sales tax in the state of purchase. The Court, in sus-
taining the tax, said:
When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is
subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of owner-
ship than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon
one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the
sum is the same when the reckoning is closed. * * * In each
situation the burden borne by the owner is balanced by an
equal burden where the sale is strictly local. 82
IV. CONCLUSION
A municipal income tax is still a relatively untried revenue
device. Only one city in the United States is known to impose
such a tax. In one other, there has been action to the same end.
The city of New York, acting under an enabling act of the state
legislature,88 passed a city income tax8' equal to fifteen percent
of the amount of the income tax paid by residents and non-resi-
dents alike to the Federal Government. It was so strongly ob-
posed by the state as an encroachment on its own sources of
revenue, however, that, as a condition for the extension of the
80. Baker v. Hasler (1925) 218 Mo. App. 1, 274 S. W. 1095; see 2
Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) secs. 914, 915).
81. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. (1937) 300 U. S. 577.
82. 300 U. S. at 584.
83. N. Y. Laws of 1934, c. 873.
84. Local Law No. 18 (1934).
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enabling act, which also authorized other city taxes more accepta-
ble to the state, the city agreed to its repeal.85 In subsequent
enabling acts, the power to impose taxes on "net income" ftas
been expressly denied."6 Thus the constitutionality of the New
York municipal income tax was never tested in the courts.
The evident purpose of the proposed ordinance is to tax those
who, while enjoying in some measure the privileges and ad-
vantages conferred by the city of St. Louis, do not share the
burden of providing these privileges and advantages. Discus-
sion of the practical aspects of this type of local taxation as to
either the feasibility or the wisdom of the tax, and of the prob-
lems of administration or collection from a local standpoint lies,
of course, beyond the proper bounds of the present treatment.
Obviously, the field of municipal excise taxation is not note-
worthy for its simplicity. The pioneering character of the tax
proposal renders prediction .as to its judicial reception hazard-
ous. Nevertheless, with the modesty dictated by the meagerness
of direct precedent, it is submitted that while there is probably
no conflict between the proposed ordinance and the Missouri con-
stitution and statutes, nor any lack of the requisite basic author-
ity under the city home rule and charter provisions, the possi-
bility that the deductions may amount to unfair discrimination
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution may constitute a serious obstacle to
validity.
ADOLPH K. SCHWARTZ.
85. The income tax was repealed prior to any collections thereunder by
Local Law No. 12 (1935).
86. N. Y. Laws of 1935, e. 601 (extending the city's power to tax to
Jine 30, 1936), and N. Y. Laws of 1936, c. 416 (extending the city's taxing
power to June 30, 1937). "This act shall not authorize the imposition of a
tax upon the income * * *." It was apparently feared that the threefold
tax (federal, state, and local) upon incomes would drive wealthy residents
outside of the state, with a consequent loss to the state's revenues.
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